New Article: Heemsbergen & Lindgren, Air Strikes and Social Media Feeds in the 2012 Israel–Hamas Conflict

Heemsbergen, Luke Justin and Simon Lindgren. “The Power of Precision Air Strikes and Social Media Feeds in the 2012 Israel–Hamas Conflict: ‘Targeting Transparency’.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68.5 (2014): 569-91.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2014.922526

 

 

Abstract

This article analyses the evolving uses of social media during wartime through the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Spokesperson Facebook and Twitter accounts. The conflict between Israel and Hamas-affiliated groups in November 2012 has generated interesting data about social media use by a sovereign power in wartime and the resultant networked discourse. Facebook data is examined for effective patterns of dissemination through both content analysis and discourse analysis. Twitter data is explored through connected concept analysis to map the construction of meaning in social media texts shared by the IDF. The systematic examination of this social media data allows the authors’ analysis to comment on the evolving modes, methods and expectations for state public diplomacy, propaganda and transparency during wartime.

New Article: Cohen, National Budget Transparency and the Israeli Health Care Policy

Cohen, Nissim. “The Power of Expertise? Politician–Bureaucrat Interactions, National Budget Transparency and the Israeli Health Care Policy.” Policy Studies 34.5-6 (2013): 638-54.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01442872.2013.804174

 

Abstract

How do ministry of Finance (MOF) bureaucrats preserve their dominance in the national budget process? As we all know, MOF bureaucrats are important in politics and policy, we know much less about exactly how they play their role. Political analysis of the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats in the Israeli healthcare policy arena reveals asymmetry of information in favour of the bureaucrats at the MOF. Among others, this asymmetry is also due to a lack of transparency in the national budgeting process. While presenting the balance of power between the players in the Israeli health policy arena, we point to the MOF bureaucrats as the most dominant players – though their power is not absolute as it always seems. Quite a few indications point at ‘non-democratic’ strategies made by these bureaucrats in their interactions with the other players. The empirical findings show that alongside bureaucrats’ expertise, strategies based on concealment, manipulation in presentation of information, lack of transparency and ‘Buying’ politicians (bribe for budgets) establish the dominance of MOF’s bureaucrats in the policy arena. Under the structural conditions of centralisation, the other players tend to find alternative solutions for promoting the public policies they seek.