New Article: O’Connell, The ‘Lessons Learned’ Trap and the Israeli Armoured Experience

O’Connell, Damien. “The ‘Lessons Learned’ Trap and How to Avoid It: Drawing from the Israeli Armoured Experience, 1948-1973.” Journal on Baltic Security 2.1 (2016): 117-28.

 

URL: http://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/JOBS/JOBS.02.1.pdf#page=121 (PDF)

 

Abstract

The following essay explores some of the problems with “lessons learned.” It offers a few tentative observations on the limitations and dangers of lessons. To illustrate these (but not necessarily prove them), it then looks at the experiences of the Israel Defence Forces, particularly its armoured forces, from 1948 to 1973. Finally, three recommendations discuss how military organizations might reduce the danger of lessons leading them astray.

 

 

 

New Article: Machold, ‘26/11’ and the Anti-Politics of Urban Security Governance

Machold, Rhys. “Learning from Israel? ‘26/11’ and the Anti-Politics of Urban Security Governance.” Security Dialogue (early view; online first).

 

URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010616645019

 

Abstract

This article calls for a greater emphasis on issues of politics and anti-politics within critical debates about transnational security governance in the metropolis. While scholars have documented the growing popularity of policy ‘models’ and ‘best practices’ in policing and urban security planning, we know little about what makes these schemes attractive to the officials who enroll in them. I take the government of Maharashtra’s decision to ‘learn from Israel’ following the 2008 Mumbai attacks (26/11) as an invitation to re-evaluate the relationships among policymaking, politics, and depoliticization. Focusing on references to Israeli security know-how as a ‘best practice’ by Maharashtra state officials, I explore how an association with Israel was used to negotiate the conflicts and controversies that followed 26/11. The article has two aims: first, it addresses how transnational policy schemes work anti-politically within particular local contexts. Second, it locates counter-terrorism policy as a form of performative politics, which is generative of policy problems. In doing so, the article helps to reclaim the political contingency of policy responses to terroristic violence and addresses the agency of policy actors in the global South.

 

 

 

New Book: Tabansky and Ben-Israel, Cybersecurity in Israel

Tabansky, Lior, and Isaac Ben Israel. Cybersecurity in Israel. New York: Springer, 2015.

This SpringerBrief gives the reader a detailed account of how cybersecurity in Israel has evolved over the past two decades. The formation of the regions cybersecurity strategy is explored and an in-depth analysis of key developments in cybersecurity policy is provided.
The authors examine cybersecurity from an integrative national perspective and see it as a set of policies and actions with two interconnected goals: to mitigate security risks and increase resilience and leverage opportunities enabled by cyber-space.
Chapters include an insight into the planning and implementation of the National Security Concept strategy which facilitated the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) agreement in 2002, (one of the first of its kind), the foundation of the Israeli Cyber-strategy in 2011, and details of the current steps being taken to establish a National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA).
Cybersecurity in Israel will be essential reading for anybody interested in cyber-security policy, including students, researchers, analysts and policy makers alike.

 

Table of Contents

Introduction
Pages 1-8

Geopolitics and Israeli Strategy
Pages 9-14

The National Innovation Ecosystem of Israel
Pages 15-30

Mid-1990s: The Prequel for National Cybersecurity Policy
Pages 31-34

The Israeli National Cybersecurity Policy Focuses on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
Pages 35-41

Seeking Cyberpower: The National Cyber Initiative, 2010
Pages 43-48

The National Cyber-Strategy of Israel and the INCB
Pages 49-54

Towards Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Pages 55-61

Striking with Bits? The IDF and Cyber-Warfare
Pages 63-69

Conclusion: From Cybersecurity to Cyberpower
Pages 71-73

 

 

New Article: Bejan and Parkin, Repressive and Conciliatory Government Actions on Terrorism

Bejan, Vladimir, and William S. Parkin. “Examining the Effect of Repressive and Conciliatory Government Actions on Terrorism Activity in Israel.” Economics Letters 133 (2015): 55-58.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.016

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of repressive and conciliatory actions by Israel on terrorist activity using vector autoregression. Increases in repressive actions lead to a significant reduction in terrorist attacks. Conciliatory actions, on the other hand, have no effect.

Highlights

• We examine the impact of the Israeli government actions on terrorist activity.
• This study endogenizes repressive and conciliatory government counterterrorism policies.
• An increase in repressive actions leads to a reduction in terrorist attacks.
• An increase in conciliatory actions has no effect on terrorism.
• Terrorists’ response to government actions is symmetric.

New Article: Magen, Media Strategies and Manipulations of Intelligence Services

Magen, Clila. “Media Strategies and Manipulations of Intelligence Services. The Case of Israel.” International Journal of Press/Politics 20.2 (2015): 247-65.

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161214556514

 

Abstract

Existing research on the relationship between Israeli intelligence services and the media is limited and fragmented. This work attempts to fill in the gaps by shedding light on four main strategies that have been commonly implemented by the Israeli intelligence community: ambiguity and concealment of media relations, the “if you would only know” strategy, exploiting patriotism and cooptation, and information manipulations and psychological warfare. These strategies were utilized frequently by Israel’s intelligence services, and thus have had an impact on the intelligence services’ accountability. However, significant changes in Israel’s society and media have created new challenges to the intelligence services in the public sphere. This study examines these changes and differentiates between the organizations within the intelligence community, domestic and foreign, which, facing differing challenges, tailor different methods for addressing the media as a result. This paper is based on several years of research and a large database of literature, media coverage, and in-depth interviews with key figures in Israel’s intelligence community (former Mossad and Israeli Security Authority directors), senior journalists, and politicians.

New Article: Rodman, Combined Arms Warfare in the Yom Kippur War

Rodman, David. “Combined Arms Warfare: The Israeli Experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.” Defence Studies 15.2 (2015): 161-74.

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2015.1043114

 

Abstract

Traditional combined arms warfare is premised on the assumption that a symmetrical mix of different kinds of units and weapons offers an army the best prospect of achieving optimal results on the battlefield. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has been accused by critics over the years of essentially abandoning the practice of traditional combined arms warfare before the 1973 Yom Kippur War in favor of a nontraditional (asymmetrical) variant that relied much too heavily on tanks and aircraft. While this criticism certainly has substantial merit, the IDF’s reverses in the early days of the war were not due solely to a lack of emphasis on traditional combined arms warfare, but rather also to a “perfect storm” of circumstances that obtained at the outset of hostilities. To its credit, the IDF learned rapidly from its prewar mistakes in force structure and war-fighting doctrine, reverting within days to a traditional approach to the practice of combined arms warfare, at least on the ground. Though not a battlefield panacea by any means, traditional combined arms warfare clearly contributed to the IDF’s eventual victory in the war.

 

New Article: Marcus, Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict

Marcus, Raphael D. “Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38.4 (2015): 500-28.

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.923767

 

Abstract

This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.

 

New Article: Byman, Five Bad Options for Gaza

Byman, Daniel. “Five Bad Options for Gaza.” Washington Quarterly 37.4 (2014): 37-53.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002153

 

Excerpt

Because of the flaws, limits, or political impossibility of some of these options, the status quo may be the best of a bunch of poor choices. Nevertheless, given the problems with Israel’s current approach and the paucity of good alternatives, some changes are necessary. The analysis suggests the importance of helping moderate Palestinians govern more competently and become politically stronger: currently they are on the path to political irrelevance. In addition, the world should offer pragmatists in Hamas political opportunities, giving them another path to success beyond violence. Finally, options that offer small changes in the status quo deserve consideration. Such steps would, over time, enable Israel to take more risks and allow everyone to move beyond the current stalemate

 

Cite: Hatuka, Transformative Terrains: Counter Hegemonic Tactics of Dissent in Israel

Hatuka, Tali. “Transformative Terrains: Counter Hegemonic Tactics of Dissent in Israel.” Geopolitics – ahead of print.

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URL:  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2012.659298

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Abstract

What makes citizens choose a particular mode of protest? This paper discusses the role of space in recent protests by three Israeli groups, Machsom Watch, Anarchists Against the Wall, and Women in Black, in Israel/Palestine. It looks at the way groups protest state violence (i.e., the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the construction of the separation wall) by initiating counter hegemonic strategies and tactics, and by creating new terrains of opposition. More specifically, I elaborate on their model of action and its function within a range of spheres (physical, geographical and virtual), supported by four key principles (difference, decentralisation, multiplicity and informal order). I argue that unlike more conventional protest rituals, often led by the dominant political parties, contemporary dissent takes place in parallel spheres constructing what I call transformative terrain – a social platform that challenges bounded politics by using imagination and space in creating new possibilities.

Cite: Carvin, The Trouble with Targeted Killing

Carvin, Stephanie. “The Trouble with Targeted Killing.” Security Studies 21.3 (2012): 529-55.

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2012.706513

Abstract

Is targeted killing an effective counterterrorism tactic? Several studies published in academic journals over the last decade differ over the answer. While some believe that it is effective as a tactic within a larger counterterrorism strategy, others believe that it has no effect or possibly a negative effect in countering terrorism. This paper argues that although current studies may be valuable for understanding the impact of targeted killing in specific case studies, they do not yet provide a basis for making general pronouncements on whether targeted killing is or is not an effective counterterrorism tactic. Problems include widely divergent definitions, a dearth of evidence, difficulties in measuring success, and the radical differences between case studies that make comparison and generalization a questionable exercise. However, while the evidence does not yet allow scholars, pundits, and policymakers to make general pronouncements on the effectiveness of targeted killing generally, it does provide grounds to begin a normative debate over whether such policies are appropriate. In addition, it suggests that researchers and policymakers should focus on gathering and improving empirical data to advance decision making on counter- terrorism tactics in the future, particularly on when targeted killing should or should not be employed.