New Article: Almog, Israel, Romania and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Accord

Almog, Orna. “Unlikely Relations: Israel, Romania and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Accord.” Middle Eastern Studies (early view; online first).

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1186015

 

Abstract

The history of Israel’s turbulent relations with the Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War has one exception, Romania. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania did not sever relations with Israel following the 1967 war. Central to these relations was Romanian Communist leader Nicolai Ceausescu, who managed to establish himself as an important figure among both Arabs and Israelis. This article will examine Romanian–Israeli relations during the 1970s and especially Ceausescu’s role in the Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. Recent Israeli and some Romanian documents released from the Israeli State Archive and the Begin Centre reveal much about Israel’s attitude towards Romania and Ceausescu’s involvement in the Middle East, and serve to shed light on a heretofore neglected aspect of Israeli foreign policy. Some of the main issues to be addressed are Ceausescu’s influence on Egyptian and Israeli decision makers, Israel’s prime motives in maintaining a close relationship with Romania, the importance of Romanian Jewry’s position to Israel’s policy vis-à-vis Romania and the extent to which these relations represented a back channel that facilitated some contact with the Kremlin. All these will be examined against the larger backdrop of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict.

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Book Chapter: Diab, al-Sādāt’s Knesset Address, Ṣulḥ, and Diplomacy

Diab, Rasha. “From the Egyptian People’s Assembly to the Israeli Knesset: al-Sādāt’s Knesset Address, Ṣulḥ, and Diplomacy.” In Shades of Ṣulḥ. The Rhetorics of Arab-Islamic Reconciliation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016): 112-60.

 

Shades of Sulh

Extract

In late November 1977, Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt undertook a risky and highly visible trip across the Egyptian-Israeli border to visit with the Knesset . The epigraph above comes from his Knesset address (hereafter KA) and sums up its overall goal, which sought to enable deliberation commensurate with the gravity of a series of wars and to attain peace. al-Sādāt’s KA interrupted and transformed a prolonged diplomatic stalemate, resuscitated peace talks, and eventually led to the Camp David Treaty. The KA and texts it deliberates with and against are the focal point of this chapter.

This chapter offers a bidimensional reading of ṣulḥ discourse, underlining how al-Sādāt’s diplomatic deliberations resuscitated Egyptian-Israeli peace talks in 1977 by drawing on a long tradition of public, formal ṣulḥ in addition to the three main features of ṣulḥ, namely initiating peace through commitment; mobilizing witnesses; and creating a community, political structure included, of peace pursuers. As such, this chapter provides yet another case where the three main features of ṣulḥ are conspicuous. I contend that these features of ṣulḥ are crucial to understanding al-Sādāt’s 1977 peace initiative and that they are the backbone of the address. However, ṣulḥ continues to be invisible in scholarship on al-Sādāt’s initiative. It is important to note that in this case ṣulḥ expresses itself in relation to other discourses that also seek to create transformative encounters, namely diplomatic discourse, border crossing, war/peace epideictic rhetoric, and policy articulations at moments of crises. In this mix, ṣulḥ can be forgotten unless we deliberately tease out its manifestation in both the symbolic and procedural dimensions of peacemaking.

 

 

ToC: Israel Studies 21.2 (2016)

Israel Studies, 21.2 (2016)

Table of Contents

 

 Front Matter (pp. i-v)

Special Section—Dislocations of Immigration

The Politics of Defining Jews from Arab Countries (pp. 1-26)

Shayna Zamkanei 

Challenges and Psychological Adjustment of Religious American Adolescent Immigrants to Israel (pp. 27-49)

Avidan Milevsky

“Marginal Immigrants”: Jewish-Argentine Immigration to the State of Israel, 1948–1967 (pp. 50-76)

Sebastian Klor

Articles

Annexation or Separation? The Municipal Status of the Jewish Neighborhoods of Jaffa 1940–1944 (pp. 77-101)

Tamir Goren

Reasoning from History: Israel’s “Peace Law” and Resettlement of the Tel Malhata Bedouin (pp. 102-132)

Havatzelet Yahel and Ruth Kark

The Israeli Names Law: National Integration and Military Rule (pp. 133-154)

Moshe Naor

 Khilul Hashem: Blasphemy in Past and Present Israel (pp. 155-181)

Gideon Aran

The Construction and De-construction of the Ashkenazi vs. Sephardic/Mizrahi Dichotomy in Israeli Culture: Rabbi Eliyahou Zini vs. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (pp. 182-205)

Joseph Ringel

Back Matter

 

 

New Article: Gavriely-Nuri, The Outbreak of Peace in Israeli Children’s Periodicals, 1977–79

Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia. “The Outbreak of Peace in Israeli Children’s Periodicals, 1977–1979.” Journal of Multicultural Discourses (early view; online first).

 
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2016.1153643

 
Abstract

This study focuses on two exceptional moments in the Egyptian–Israeli history of conflict: the visit of President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the signing of the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979. Combining peace studies, cultural studies and discourse analysis, the article analyzes the response of Israeli most popular children’s periodicals to these dramatic peace events in real time, during the months in which they occurred. The article’s contribution to peace research lies in its ability to shed light on how intergenerational discourse conveys peace legacy, a relatively neglected arena in peace research. In doing so, it likewise focuses on the discursive ‘failures’ embedded in the Israeli peace discourse.

 

 

 

Dissertation: Condron, The Nixon Administration between Cairo and Jerusalem

Condron, Aidan. The Nixon Administration between Cairo and Jerusalem, 1969-1974: Concepts, Strategies, and Implementation, PhD thesis. Aberystwyth, Wales: Aberystwyth University, 2015.
 
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2160/30577
 
Abstract

This thesis traces the origins of the Egypt-Israel peace process begun in the immediate aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This American-brokered process led to the restoration of Egyptian land seized by Israeli in 1967 in exchange for a bilateral peace treaty, the first between Israel and an Arab state. Formal US-Egypt diplomatic relations were restored in 1974. By the time of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979, Egyptian defection from Soviet to American was complete, and Egypt had become estranged from the remainder of the Arab world, which refused to recognise, negotiate, or make peace with Israel. Recontextualising wartime and post-war strategic realignments with reference to developments during the first four and three-quarter years of the Nixon administration, from January 1969 – September 1973, this thesis sets presents a thoroughgoing revisionist account of the origins of this process. Tracing concepts and strategies implemented during and after the war in the antebellum period, the work demonstrates that the concepts implemented during the peace process were developed in negotiations involving Egypt, Israel, the Soviet Union, and the United States from early 1969, and forged into a coherent strategy by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during the period from October 1970 – September 1973. Reversing the usual interpretation that Sadat conformed to an American grand design in the aftermath over the October War, this thesis demonstrates instead that the United States collaborated and colluded in implementing an Egyptian strategy for a new regional order, premised on peace between Egypt and Israel and partnerships both between Washington and Jerusalem and between Washington and Cairo.

 

 

 

ToC: Israel Affairs 22.1 (2016)

Israel Affairs, Volume 22, Issue 1, January 2016 is now available online on Taylor & Francis Online.

This new issue contains the following articles:

Articles Sixty-two years of national insurance in Israel
Abraham Doron
Pages: 1-19 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111632

Rethinking reverence for Stalinism in the kibbutz movement
Reuven Shapira
Pages: 20-44 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111640

Making war, thinking history: David Ben-Gurion, analogical reasoning and the Suez Crisis
Ilai Z. Saltzman
Pages: 45-68 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111638

 
Military power and foreign policy inaction: Israel, 1967‒1973
Moshe Gat
Pages: 69-95 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111636
Arab army vs. a Jewish kibbutz: the battle for Mishmar Ha’emek, April 1948
Amiram Ezov
Pages: 96-125 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111633
Lip-service to service: the Knesset debates over civic national service in Israel, 1977–2007
Etta Bick
Pages: 126-149 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111630
State‒diaspora relations and bureaucratic politics: the Lavon and Pollard affairs
Yitzhak Mualem
Pages: 150-171 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111637
Developing Jaffa’s port, 1920‒1936
Tamir Goren
Pages: 172-188 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111634
University, community, identity: Ben-Gurion University and the city of Beersheba – a political cultural analysis
Yitzhak Dahan
Pages: 189-210 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111631
The Palestinian/Arab Strategy to Take Over Campuses in the West – Preliminary Findings
Ron Schleifer
Pages: 211-235 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111639
Identity of immigrants – between majority perceptions and self-definition
Sibylle Heilbrunn, Anastasia Gorodzeisky & Anya Glikman
Pages: 236-247 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111635
Book Reviews
Jabotinsky: a life
David Rodman
Pages: 248-249 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2016.112095

Ethos clash in Israeli society
David Rodman
Pages: 250-251 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2016.1120967

Nazis, Islamists and the making of the modern Middle East
David Rodman
Pages: 252-254 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2016.1120968
The new American Zionism
David Rodman
Pages: 255-257 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2016.1120969
Rise and decline of civilizations: lessons for the Jewish people
David Rodman
Pages: 258-259 | DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2016.1120970

New Book: Gartman, Return to Zion

Gartman, Eric. Return to Zion. The History of Modern Israel. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.

 

returnZion

 

The history of modern Israel is a story of ambition, violence, and survival. Return to Zion traces how a scattered and stateless¬ people reconstituted themselves in their traditional homeland, only to face threats by those who, during the many years of the dispersion, had come to regard the land as their home. This is a story of the “ingathering of the exiles” from Europe to an outpost on the fringes of the Ottoman Empire, of courage and perseverance, and of reinvention and tragedy.

Eric Gartman focuses on two main themes of modern Israel: reconstitution and survival. Even as new settlers built their state they faced constant challenges from hostile neighbors and divided support from foreign governments, as well as being attacked by larger armies no fewer than three times during the first twenty-five years of Israel’s history. Focusing on a land torn by turmoil, Return to Zion is the story of Israel—the fight for independence through the Israeli Independence War in 1948, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the near-collapse of the Israeli Army during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Gartman examines the roles of the leading figures of modern Israel—Theodor Herzl, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzchak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon—alongside popular perceptions of events as they unfolded in the post–World War II decades. He presents declassified CIA, White House, and U.S. State Department documents that detail America’s involvement in the 1967 and 1973 wars, as well as proof that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was a case of mistaken identity. Return to Zion pulls together the myriad threads of this history from inside and out to create a seamless look into modern Israel’s truest self.

Eric Gartman is an intelligence analyst for the United States Department of Defense who has lived and studied in Israel and traveled extensively throughout the Middle East.

New Book: Ross, Doomed to Succeed

Ross, Dennis. Doomed to Succeed. The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015.

 

9780374141462

 

When it comes to Israel, U.S. policy has always emphasized the unbreakable bond between the two countries and our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security. Today our ties to Israel are close–so close that when there are differences, they tend to make the news. But it was not always this way.
Dennis Ross has been a direct participant in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and Israel specifically, for nearly thirty years. He served in senior roles, including as Bill Clinton’s envoy for Arab-Israeli peace, and was an active player in the debates over how Israel fit into the region and what should guide our policies. In Doomed to Succeed, he takes us through every administration from Truman to Obama, throwing into dramatic relief each president’s attitudes toward Israel and the region, the often tumultuous debates between key advisers, and the events that drove the policies and at times led to a shift in approach.
Ross points out how rarely lessons were learned and how distancing the United States from Israel in the Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations never yielded any benefits and why that lesson has never been learned. Doomed to Succeed offers compelling advice for how to understand the priorities of Arab leaders and how future administrations might best shape U.S. policy in that light.

 

Table of Contents

Preface
1. The Evolution of US Policy toward Israel
2. The Eisenhower Administration and the Pursuit of Arab Allies
3. The Kennedy Administration: Breaking Taboos and Pursuing a New Balance
4. Lyndon Baines Johnson: Emotional Ties but Constrained by Vietnam
5. Nixon and Ford: Dysfunction, War, and Interim Agreements
6. The Carter Presidency: The Pursuit of Peace and Constant Tension with Israel
7. The Reagan Administration and the Policy of Duality
8. George H. W. Bush and Israel: Discord and Responsiveness
9. The Clinton Administration and Israel: Strategic Partners for Peace
10. Bush 43: Terror, Partnership, and Bureaucratic Divisions
11. Obama and Israel: Support for Security, Little Chemistry, and Constant Challenges
12. Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future
Notes
Acknowledgements
Index
 

 

Dennis Ross is the Counselor and Davidson Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown. He was the director of policy planning in the State Department for George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton’s Middle East Peace envoy, and a special assistant to the president under Barack Obama.

 

 

Thesis: Gerdes, Israeli Public Opinion and the Camp David Accords

Gerdes, Daniel L. The Possibility of Peace: Israeli Public Opinion and the Camp David Accords, Hamline University Departmental Honors Projects, 2015.

 

URL: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/dhp/28/

Advisor: Nurith Zmora

 

Abstract

The Camp David Accords, September 5-17, 1978, were a momentous development in Middle East relations. For over 30 years Israel and her neighbors weathered periods of warfare and aggression, but when leaders from Egypt, Israel, and the United States descended on Camp David in the United States for two weeks of peace negotiations everything changed. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin became the first leaders in the Middle East to negotiate peace after decades of war between the two countries. This research discerns the changes in Israeli public opinion on the peace process with Egypt that occurred between the 1973 Yom Kippur War (the last major conflict between Egypt and Israel), and the 1978 Camp David Accords. Understanding these changes helps bring to light new aspects of the peace process that have not received as much scholarly attention in the past—in particular, the changing discussion within Israeli society. This research examines the public debate in Israel prior to the accords, and specifically the role of the press in disseminating commonly held political beliefs of the general Israeli public. This project centers on analyzing articles from four major Israeli newspapers which represent different audiences in Israeli society to shed light on the changing perspectives held by Israelis from 1973 to 1978. Five major events were identified for this period: the 1973 war, the military disengagement after the war, the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem, before the Camp David conference, and after the Camp David Conference. Articles were selected from the various newspapers reflecting public opinion about each event. Each article was analyzed with special attention paid to changes in arguments, opinions, and messages over time from various political perspectives in Israel. Scholars claimed that Sadat’s famous 1977 visit to Jerusalem was the defining moment in the change of public opinion on peace with Egypt; however, my research shows a gradual shift in public opinion toward peace starting after the 1973 war. These changes in discourse about peace can enhance understanding of the effects of public discourse on foreign policy and peace negotiations in the Middle East; they could also help explain the tremendous difficulty in achieving lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

New Article: Aronoff & Aronoff, Spatial Narratives of Border Crossings between Israel, Jordan and Egypt

Aronoff, Eric and Yael Aronoff. “Bordering on Peace: Spatial Narratives of Border Crossings between Israel, Jordan and Egypt.” In The Design of Frontier Spaces. Control and Ambiguity (ed. Carolyn Loeb and Andreas Luescher; Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), 129-55.

frontiers

Excerpt

These questions about border narratives are the focus of this essay. Examining the border crossings between Israel and the two neighboring states with which it has open borders, Jordan and Egypt, we analyze the narratives created in these spaces through

the arrangement of space, iconography, and signage, as well as the legal elements that also regulate the flow of persons across the borders. These sites, in effect, constitute the first encounter of travelers with the new state about to be entered; as such, these spatial, visual and legal elements combine to create a “story” being told to that traveler (even if that traveler is a member of that community who is returning). That story may be intentional, the result of a conscious effort or policy on the part of the state, or unintentional as the ad hoc reflection of attitudes and ideas expressing themselves through the choices made “on the ground” by border personnel. That story is both about who “they” – the imagined community whose territory the traveler is about to enter – are and what they represent; it also simultaneously is about who “you,” the traveler, might be – why you might be there, the relationship imagined between “they” and “you.” Like a text, these spaces construct both their ideal “author” and their ideal “reader.”

In this way, like many of the chapters in this volume, our approach extends but also differs from much of the scholarship that makes up the recent resurgence of border studies. As many scholars have pointed out, rising attention across multiple disciplines to issues of globalism and transnationalism, as well as cultural studies approaches to concepts heretofore in the domain of social science, have resulted in increased interest in borders (Newman, 2011). Until relatively recently, borders have been approached within the fields of international relations or geography as static, empirical entities, largely in the context of examining relations between states (Sack, 1986; Taylor, 1994; Shapiro and Alker, 1996). More recent theories emanating from anthropology and cultural studies have emphasized the social construction of boundaries as processes for defining personal, group and national identities, through processes of inclusion and exclusion, defining the “self” and the “Other.” These approaches have broadened the concept of “borders” to include not only the actual borderline between states, but many other kinds of borders. In this conception, borders are everywhere, and the “border narratives” that constitute them are made up of multiple discourses and texts: newspapers, political speeches, posters, poems, plays, novels, everyday speech that give meaning to the border as the “construction of institutionalized forms of ‘we’ and the ‘other’ which are produced and perpetually reproduced in education texts, narratives and discourses” (Newman and Paasi, 1998, p. 196).

Seminar: Azrieli Institute Student-Faculty Seminar (March 18, 2015)

Azrieli-March

 

Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies

Student-Faculty Seminars

Wednesday March 18, 2015

10:30AM-12:30PM

A History of Conflict Between Israel and Palestine: Can the U.N. Ever Facilitate a Two-State Solution?

Kristy Rogers, Masters Candidate, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

 

Why Peacemaking Begins with States and Ends with Societies: Evidence from Arab-Israeli Peace Treaties

Professor Norrin Ripsman, Department of Political Science

 

‘Rebellion Was Strong Amongst Them’: Irish Jews and National Politics, 1900-1922

Mike Rast, PhD Candidate, Department of History

 

Yehuda Kaufman (Even Shmuel): The Portrait of an Israeli Scholar, Intellectual, and Activist, 1927-1976

Professor Ira Robinson, Department of Religion

 

Click here for a PDF file of the flyer.

New Article: Blanga, Egypt’s Relations with the US and Israel

Blanga, Yehuda U. “Nasser’s Dilemma: Egypt’s Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69.” Middle Eastern Studies 51.2 (2015): 301-26.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2014.942648

 

Abstract

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt’s dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president’s attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.

New Article: Aran and Ginat, Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak

Aran, Amnon and Rami Ginat. “Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From Cold Peace to Strategic Peace.” Journal of Strategic Studies 37.4 (2014): 556-83.

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2014.923766

Abstract

This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace.

ToC: Israel Studies 19.3 (2014)

Israel Studies 19.3 (2014): Table of Contents

ToC: Journal of Israeli History 33.2 (2014)

Journal of Israeli History 33.2 (2014): Table of Contents

 

Articles

Communists and the 1948 War: PCP, Maki, and the National Liberation League

Ilana Kaufman
pages 115-144

Mapam in the War of Independence: From the war front to the opposition back benches

The Israeli left between culture and politics: Tzavta and Mapam, 1956–1973

Tal Elmaliach
pages 169-183

From Yekke to Zionist: Narrative strategies in life stories of Central European Jewish women immigrants to Mandate Palestine

Dorit Yosef
pages 185-208

“Operation Exodus”: Israeli government involvement in the production of Otto Preminger’s Film Exodus (1960)

Giora Goodman
pages 209-229

Book Reviews

1929: Shnat ha-efes ba-sikhsukh ha-yehudi-aravi [1929: Year zero of the Jewish-Arab conflict]

Motti Golani
pages 231-235

 Menachem Begin: A Life

Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak

Uriya Shavit
pages 238-241

Embodying Hebrew Culture: Aesthetics, Athletics, and Dance in the Jewish Community of Mandate Palestine

Shelly Zer-Zion
pages 241-244

Editorial Board

Editorial Board
page ebi

Lecture: Lawrence Wright on Camp David’s Complex Peace

Tuesday, September 16, 2014, 7:30 – 8:45pm

Lawrence Wright: Camp David’s Complex Peace

In September of 1978, three nations came together at Camp David to create what ultimately became the first Middle Eastern peace treaty. Through a day-by-day account of the peace talks, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Lawrence Wright looks at how this landmark agreement was reached. Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David is the untold story of Carter’s push for peace, hard feelings felt by participants, and far-reaching implications of the agreement. By analyzing the actions of President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, he offers “hallmark insight” into those tense days. He’ll also analyze the ripple effects created by this tumultuous process. Wright is also the author of Going Clear, The Looming Tower, and a staff writer with The New Yorker.

Post-Event Discussion: Following the program, there will be a post-event discussion moderated by Resat Kesaba, Director of UW’s Jackson School of International Studies, as part of Town Hall’s Civic Roundtable Series. Stay for this 9 pm discussion to share thoughts on Wright’s lecture and learn about the Jackson School’s resources for staying up-to-date on current affairs in the Middle East.

Presented by: Town Hall, World Affairs Council, and University Book Store, as part of the Civics series. Series supported by The Boeing Company, the RealNetworks Foundation, and the True-Brown Foundation. Series media sponsorship provided by The Stranger and KUOW.
Tickets: $5.
Town Hall member benefits: Priority seating, discounted onsite book sales.
Doors open: 6:30 p.m.

URL: http://www.townhallseattle.org/lawrence-wright-camp-davids-complex-peace/

 

New Article: Wolf, Peacemaking and Political Survival in Sadat’s Egypt

Wolf, Albert B. “Peacemaking and Political Survival in Sadat’s Egypt.” Middle East Policy 21.2 (2014): 127-39.

 

URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12076/abstract

 

 

Excerpt

By May 1980, the peace process served as the opposition’s focal point for action against the regime. The Lawyers’ Syndicate joined the opposition and helped groups coordinate with one another. By summer 1981, these forces joined the other syndicates in the country to oppose the treaty with Israel. The opposition cited the Knesset’s passage of a law making Jerusalem the indivisible capital of Israel and the Begin government’s attacks on the PLO in Lebanon as evidence that Sadat had abandoned the Palestinians and was helping to promote Israeli aggression.

The regime’s continued support for normalizing relations with Israel contributed to the outbreak of the protests known as the Autumn of Fury. By September 1981, nearly 1,500 of Sadat’s critics, including the Coptic pope, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the brother of the man who would murder Sadat, were arrested. Khalid al-Islambouli and three fellow Islamic fundamentalists assassinated Sadat on October 6, 1981, during a military parade commemorating the October War of 1973. Al-Islambouli later said that he was primarily motivated by the signing of the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel treaty of 1979.

[…]

This piece provides a first cut into the political consequences for non-democratic leaders pursuing cooperation with enduring rivals: they risk their political survival. Autocracies often use foreign antagonisms as a means to legitimate their rule. When longstanding conflicts are resolved, domestic challengers are provided with a focal point for organizing against the regime and presenting themselves as a patriotic alternative to the incumbent. Ensuing protests threaten to unseat the nominal leadership by unleashing a secondary bandwagon of opposition movements, or by promoting a coup or revolution. In Egypt, peacemaking with Israel led to the Autumn of Fury and the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

This piece indicates a few additional avenues for future research. To what extent are the paper’s results generalizable beyond the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli dispute? Do the domestic pressures examined here give dictators a bargaining advantage with their rivals (as arguments on hands-tying suggest), or do they make dictators seem unreliable and untrustworthy, especially when bargaining over objects that affect the future balance of power. A third direction to investigate is whether these domestic pressures increase the credibility of secret diplomacy. Dictators who are likely to be punished for pursuing cooperation send a costly signal of their benign intent when they “go private” or pursue secret diplomacy with an enemy. When they talk to an adversary behind closed doors, dictators are putting their domestic political survival in the enemy’s hands. If he chooses to make the content of the negotiations public, it could destroy the dictator’s hold on power.

New Article: Israeli, The 1973 War: Link to Israeli-Egyptian Peace

Israeli, Ofer. “The 1973 War: Link to Israeli-Egyptian Peace.” Middle East Policy 20.4 (2013): 88-98.

 

URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12048/abstract

 

Extract

Sadat’s principal goals before the 1973 war included trying to recover the Sinai Peninsula and gaining Washington’s support. Kissinger’s belief prior to the war was that Cairo would finally turn to the United States for help in negotiating a settlement with Jerusalem. Their predictions ultimately proved correct, but at the cost of the October 1973 war. Sadat consciously expected military loses, but the war was fought for a political objective that he shrewdly calculated he would achieve. In the end, Sadat was right and Israel returned to Egypt the territory lost in the 1967 war.

The historic significance of the Camp David accords lies in the fact that Egypt, the largest and the most important Arab state, acknowledged Israel’s legitimacy. In February 1980, Egypt and Israel established normal international relations, an event that deepened both regional and international controversy.

ToC: Israel Studies 19.1 (2014)

  1. Special Section—Arabs as Israeli Citizens
    1. Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon and the Arab Draft That Never Was (pp. 1-23)
      Randall S. Geller
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.1

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.1

    2. The Contemporary Historiographical Debate in Israel on Government Policies on Arabs in Israel During the Military Administration Period (1948–1966) (pp. 24-47)
      Arik Rudnitzky
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.24

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.24

    3. The Politization of History and the Negev Bedouin Land Claims: A Review Essay on Indigenous (In)justice (pp. 48-74)
      Seth J. Frantzman
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.48

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.48

    4. Increased Constructive Engagement Among Israeli Arabs: The Impact of Government Economic Initiatives (pp. 75-97)
      Robert Cherry
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.75

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.75

    5. Democracy, Clan Politics and Weak Governance: The Case of the Arab Municipalities in Israel (pp. 98-125)
      Yakub Halabi
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.98

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.98

    6. The Quest for Identity in Sayed Kashua’s Let It Be Morning (pp. 126-144)
      Michael Keren
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.126

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.126

  2. Articles
    1. From Peace in the South to War in the North: Menachem Begin as Prime Minister, 1977–1983 (pp. 145-165)
      Yechiam Weitz
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.145

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.145

    2. Societal Values: Impact on Israel Security—The Kibbutz Movement as a Mobilized Elite (pp. 166-188)
      Zeev Drory
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.166

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.166

    3. Postsecular Jewish Theology: Reading Gordon And Buber (pp. 189-213)
      Hagar Lahav
      DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.189

      Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.189

  3. Notes on Contributors (pp. 214-215)
    DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.214

    Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.214

  4. Guidelines for Contributors (pp. 216-218)
    DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.216

    Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.19.1.216

Cite: Zakariah, Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-74

Zakariah, M. H. “Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-74: British Attitude and Perspective.” Middle Eastern Studies 48.4 (2012): 589-611.

 

URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/mes/2012/00000048/00000004/art00006  

 

Abstract

The Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 resulted in several peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours brokered by the US, the Soviet Union and European countries in an attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. All efforts however proved ultimately futile, with the resumption of war several years after each peace treaty had been signed. For example, after the Six Day War of 1967, all parties agreed to accept a peace treaty based upon United Nations Resolution 242. However, six years after the tabling of the resolution, war broke out again on October 1973. Another long process of peace settlement ensued which culminated in the Camp David Accords, brokered by President Jimmy Carter. These peace accords, signed between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel on 17 September 1978, led directly to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Despite its success, the 1979 treaty yet again failed to achieve the just and lasting peace settlement that had been expected. In all these treaties, the core issues of the conflict, such as the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of East Jerusalem, failed to be resolved. This article examines the British attitude and perspective towards the peace settlement after the 1973 war, focussing on the proposal for an International Peace Guarantee and the initiative of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Based upon declassified archival records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at the National Archives in England, it unveils the attitude of the British government towards the UN Resolutions as well as its collective initiatives with the European Community to establish a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.