New Article: Kolander, The 1967 Arab–Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?

Kolander, Kenny. “The 1967 Arab–Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?” Middle Eastern Studies (early view; online first).

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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2015.1084294

 

Abstract

This paper considers two aspects of historiography about the 1967 Arab–Israeli war – American and Soviet foreign policy in the region – to better appreciate the Soviet role in the outbreak of hostilities, as well as how the war concretized the USA–Israel ‘special relationship’ and weakened American–Arab relations. Relying especially on research from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library and Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), this paper argues that Soviet officials had little interest in pursuing measures to prevent war during the prewar crisis because the situation promised to undermine American interests in the region.

 

 

 

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Reviews: Jones & Petersen, eds., Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies

Jones, Clive and Tore T. Petersen, eds. Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

 

9780199330669

 

Reviews

  • Eran, Oded. “Review.” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 8.2 (2014): 103-105.
  • Rodman, David. “Review.” Israel Affairs 20.3 (2014): 442-444.
  • Inbar, Efraim. “Review.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26.1 (2015): 201-202.

 
 
 
 
 

New Book: Siniver, The Yom Kippur War. Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy

Siniver, Asaf, ed. The Yom Kippur War. Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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URL: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-yom-kippur-war-9780199334810

The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the modern Middle East more broadly. It marked the beginning of a US-led peace process between Israel and her Arab neighbours; it introduced oil diplomacy as a new means of leverage in international politics; and it affected irreversibly the development of the European Community and the Palestinian struggle for independence. Moreover, the regional order which emerged at the end of the war remained largely unchallenged for nearly four decades, until the recent wave of democratic revolutions in the Arab world. The fortieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War provides a timely opportunity to reassess the major themes that emerged during the war and in its aftermath, and the contributors to this book provide the first comprehensive account of the domestic and international factors which informed the policies of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, as well as external actors before, during and after the war. In addition to chapters on the superpowers, the EU and the Palestinians, the book also deals with the strategic themes of intelligence and political of the war on Israeli and Arab societies.

 

 

Table of Contents

List of Contributors

1. Introduction
Asaf Siniver

2. Dominant Themes in the October War Historiography: Blame and Historical Analogy
Carly Beckerman-Boys

3. Israel and the October War
Jacob Eriksson

4. The October War and Egypt’s Multiple Crossings
Yoram Meital

5. Syria and the October War: The Missed Opportunity
Eyal Zisser

6. US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem
Asaf Siniver

7. The Soviet Union and the October War
Galia Golan

8. Jordan’s War that Never Was
Assaf David

9. Palestinian Politics in Transition: The Case of the October War
Philipp O. Amour

10. Faraway Causes, Immediate Effects: The War and European Consequences
Rory Miller

11. Oil and the October War
David Painter

12. Ashraf Marwan and Israel’s Intelligence Failure
Ahron Bregman

13. Evolving a Diplomatic Legacy from the War: The US, Egyptian and Israeli Triangle
Kenneth W. Stein

14. Clashing Narratives of the October War: Collective Memory and Group Perspective
Claudia De Martino

15. Gone But Not Forgotten? The Occasional Lessons of the October War
Clive Jones

New Article: Kaufman, The Trans-Arabian Pipeline and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Kaufman, Asher. “Between Permeable and Sealed Borders: The Trans-Arabian Pipeline and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46.1 (2014): 95-116.

 

URL:  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9173781

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002074381300130X

 

Abstract

The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), which extended from Dhahran in Saudi Arabia to Zahrani in Lebanon and operated from 1950 to 1982, was haunted by the Arab–Israeli conflict throughout the years of its operation. The route of the pipeline—which traversed Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—was chosen so as to circumvent Palestine/Israel. However, following the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights in the 1967 war, Israel became an active participant in this project, with the full consent of the transit states and Egypt. This article uses Tapline as a means to analyze the interconnected world facilitated by oil pipelines, which defies common wisdom about state sovereignty or the function of interstate boundaries. In addition, Tapline demonstrates how this interconnected network created possibilities for Arab–Israeli cooperation that might have seemed inconceivable initially, given the hostile dynamics of the conflict.

ToC: Israel Affairs, 19.4 (2013)

Israel Affairs: Volume 19, Issue 4, 2013

Articles

Anatomy of decline: Anglo-Soviet competition in the Middle East, 1956–67

Moshe Gat
pages 603-622

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829610
The impact of the cold war on the Thatcher government’s Middle East policy

Azriel Bermant
pages 623-639

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829607

Ending the Second Lebanon War: the interface between the political and military echelons in Israel

Shmuel Tzabag
pages 640-659

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829614
The ‘Annapolis Process’: a chronology of failure

Amira Schiff
pages 660-678

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829612

War and peace in Judaism and Islam

Moshe Cohen
pages 679-692

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829608

A reassessment of the 1967 Arab oil embargo

Joseph Mann
pages 693-703

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829611

Paradigmatic changes in perceptions of disciplinary and multidisciplinary teaching in Israeli higher education system: fad or challenge?

Nitza Davidovitch
pages 704-712

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829609

Election year economics and political budget cycle in Israel – myth or reality

Tal Shahor
pages 713-730

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829613

Review Essay

The politics of the Israeli Pantheon

Nissim Leon
pages 731-734

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829615

Book Reviews

60 years: Israel navy

David Rodman
pages 735-736

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829616

Legacy: a genetic history of the Jewish people

David Rodman
page 736

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829618

Mossad; Spies against Armageddon: inside Israel’s secret wars

David Rodman
pages 737-738

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829619

Moshe Dayan: Israel’s controversial hero

David Rodman
pages 738-739

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829620

Abdullah al-Tall, Arab Legion officer: Arab nationalism and opposition to the Hashemite regime

David Rodman
pages 739-740

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829621

Israel: the will to prevail

David Rodman
pages 740-741

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829622

The promise of Israel: why its seemingly greatest weakness is actually its greatest strength

David Rodman
pages 741-742

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829623

Judah in the Neo-Babylonian period: the archaeology of desolation

David Rodman
pages 742-743

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829624

Struggling over Israel’s soul: an IDF general speaks of his controversial moral decisions

David Rodman
pages 743-744

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829625

Asset test: how the United States benefits from its alliance with Israel

David Rodman
pages 744-746

DOI:10.1080/13537121.2013.829617

Editorial Board

Editorial Board

Cite: Zakariah, Euro-Arab Dialogue 1973–1978

Zakariah, Muhamad Hasrul. “The Euro-Arab Dialogue 1973–1978: Britain Reinsurance Policy in the Middle East Conflict.” European Review of History 20.1 (2013): 95-115.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13507486.2012.744385

 

Abstract

The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was launched in the aftermath the Arab Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973 by Nine European countries and the Arabs. The main objective was to create a stable, long-term relationship between the two regions. Despite its political intent, the framework of the Dialogue was restricted to multilateral economic co-operation in selected areas for reciprocal benefits. Due to inevitable obstacles, after almost five years of engagements, the Dialogue seemed to be progressing slowly with the development of only a few practical projects. Nevertheless, the British remained committed to the initiative, which they viewed as supplementary to their successful existing bilateral relationships, as well as an inexpensive but effective way to maintain their political and economic interests in the Arab world. Through historical analysis, this paper examines the British attitude and perspective towards the Dialogue from 1973 to 1978, mainly using archival documents available at the National Archive in England.

Cite: Stocker, The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean

Stocker, James. "No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean." Middle East Journal 66.4 (2012): 579-597.

URL: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_middle_east_journal/v066/66.4.stocker.html

Abstract

The discovery of oil and natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean Sea has the potential to exacerbate conflicts in the area. There are many possible ways to prevent this from happening, but each requires the states of the region to cooperate, which is unlikely for numerous reasons. This article reviews the various conflicts that have emerged or are emerging over this issue and suggests possible solutions.

Cite: Zakariah, Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-74

Zakariah, M. H. “Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-74: British Attitude and Perspective.” Middle Eastern Studies 48.4 (2012): 589-611.

 

URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/mes/2012/00000048/00000004/art00006  

 

Abstract

The Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 resulted in several peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours brokered by the US, the Soviet Union and European countries in an attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. All efforts however proved ultimately futile, with the resumption of war several years after each peace treaty had been signed. For example, after the Six Day War of 1967, all parties agreed to accept a peace treaty based upon United Nations Resolution 242. However, six years after the tabling of the resolution, war broke out again on October 1973. Another long process of peace settlement ensued which culminated in the Camp David Accords, brokered by President Jimmy Carter. These peace accords, signed between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel on 17 September 1978, led directly to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Despite its success, the 1979 treaty yet again failed to achieve the just and lasting peace settlement that had been expected. In all these treaties, the core issues of the conflict, such as the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of East Jerusalem, failed to be resolved. This article examines the British attitude and perspective towards the peace settlement after the 1973 war, focussing on the proposal for an International Peace Guarantee and the initiative of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Based upon declassified archival records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at the National Archives in England, it unveils the attitude of the British government towards the UN Resolutions as well as its collective initiatives with the European Community to establish a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.