A preliminary work aimed at allocating suitable new sites for possible NPPs in Israel is presented. The work is based on Israel’s present NPP siting criteria, supported by selected procedure performed by various countries that conducted similar process. The site selection process was conducted in two stages: first, a selection procedure using demographic analysis was conducted; second, a seismological and geological analysis process was performed in the remaining area. From the combined two screening processes results, an overall new area of 569 km2 was located as a possible area for future construction of NPPs in Israel. Further and more comprehensive work, based on the IAEAs site selection guidelines, has to be performed in the future, in order to verify the preliminary findings presented in this work.
The American-Israeli relationship underwent a dramatic transformation during the 1960s. From its establishment in 1948 and throughout the 1950s, Israel had largely been kept at arm’s length by the administration of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Both feared that an intimate relationship with Israel would alienate the Arab world, and therefore threaten access to Middle Eastern oil, as well as encourage Soviet penetration of the region. The truncated logic in formulating its Middle Eastern policy, but eventually came around to adopting a more favorable attitude toward Israel. Presidnet Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration deepened the trend begun by its predecessor. And, by the early 1970s, during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, Israel had come to be seen as a strategic asset to the United States in its quest to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Morag, Nadav. “The Strategic Impact of an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability on Israel.” In Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges, NATO Science for Peace and Security series (ed. Samuel Apikyan and David Diamond; Dordrecht: Springer, 2015): 135-46.
This paper will address the likely strategic impact of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability on Israeli security, both in terms of the country’s regional standing within the Middle East, and in terms of its homeland security issues. It should be emphasized that an Iranian capacity to produce and deploy nuclear weapons in a fairly short period of time will have largely the same strategic impact on Israel as an already existing Iranian nuclear weapons capability because Iran will be able to claim that, by developing this capacity, it will be able to counter Israeli “aggression” in the Middle East, thus enhancing its prestige in the region and beyond. Moreover, an Iranian capability to develop and deploy nuclear weapons may embolden Iran to risk further confrontation with Israel, the United States, and America’s Arab allies because a nuclear weapons capability is likely to be perceived in Teheran, particularly by regime hardliners, as an insurance policy against a catastrophic attack on Iran that could threaten the regime’s hold on power. Finally, even if Iran does not actually build nuclear weapons, once it has the capacity to build them in a short period of time, Israel will need to think about the implications of their use against Israeli cities and what this means for its homeland security.
Over the last twenty years, there has been an increase in security-related Track 2 dialogues in the Middle East. Yet, with Israel, one of the region’s most important states and a nuclear power, few Track 2 dialogues addressing mutual security concerns have been held. They are needed to foster a more open exchange and discussion of emerging mutual security issues. This study will evaluate the feasibility and scope of a future Track 2 dialogue between the United States and Israel within the 2016 timeframe.
This project involves background research and analysis, including of past attempts to establish Track 1.5 strategic dialogues and the reasons they have failed. Additionally, researchers will conduct in-depth consultations with current and former U.S. government and non-government personnel. They will also travel to Israel to discuss the project’s objectives with a select group of Israeli government and non-government interlocutors. Subjects for discussion will include Iran’s nuclear program, Syria’s civil war, a Middle East WMD-free zone, extended deterrence, missile defense, and other emerging security issues.
Rabinowitz, Or, and Nicholas L. Miller. “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan.” International Security 40.1 (2015): 47-86. URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00207
How has the United States behaved historically toward friendly states with nuclear weapons ambitions? Recent scholarship has demonstrated the great lengths to which the United States went to prevent Taiwan, South Korea, and West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet seemingly on the other side of the ledger are cases such as Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan, where the United States failed to prevent proliferation, and where many have argued that the United States made exceptions to its nonproliferation objectives given conflicting geopolitical goals. A reexamination of the history of U.S. nonproliferation policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan, based on declassified documents and interviews, finds that these cases are not as exceptional as is commonly understood. In each case, the United States sought to prevent these states from acquiring nuclear weapons, despite geopolitical constraints. Moreover, once U.S. policymakers realized that prior efforts had failed, they continued to pursue nonproliferation objectives, brokering deals to prevent nuclear tests, public declaration of capabilities, weaponization, or transfer of nuclear materials to other states.