The literature on Lebanese resistance to Israel is overwhelmed with work on Hezbollah, the role of religion, and its connection to Iranian influence. However, few of these studies have looked at the totality of Lebanese resistance, from its secular origins to its Islamic monopoly. Moreover, no work to date has looked at Lebanese resistance through the prism of just war theory. This article aims at addressing this gap by applying the criteria introduced by Childress regarding the justness of war. Moreover, the article examines resistance as a practice of non-state actors and its terrorist label, and at the same time, evaluates Israel’s military response to Lebanese resistance through the prism of state terrorism.
The European Union’s structural weakness in foreign policy making, and the emphasis on soft power in promoting norms, contribute significantly to its close cooperation with civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).The EU provides core funding to hundreds of NGOs and receives legitimacy, information, and analysis from them. In return, this interdependence allows NGOs to expand their impact in many areas, including foreign policy.
This study analyses the relationship between NGOs and EU decision-making in the foreign policy realm, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict. By examining EU documents on key issues, such as Jerusalem, settlements, Israeli-Arab citizens, and guidelines for cooperation with Israeli institutions, the article highlights the direct impact of selected NGOs. We argue that the close and mutual NGO-EU dependency has significant political and theoretical ramifications.
Why do states responsible for unleashing violent nonstate actors fail to halt them despite rising costs and, at best, marginal utility? I argue that a historical-institutionalist approach helps scholars understand these dynamics. I present five path-dependent mechanisms—change in the balance of power, spiraling perception of threat, ideological shift among the public, state penetration, and weakening of the principle of state primacy—that diminish the prospects of policy reversals. I then demonstrate the usefulness of path-dependency analysis in the case of Israel’s entanglement with the Jewish messianic Right. Applying the theoretical framework sheds light on the process that brought Israel prohibitive costs—undercutting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, undermining the state’s international standing, and weakening the state’s authority and democratic nature—and made policy reversal, in line with the state’s national interest and its responsibilities as a member of the international society, highly unlikely.
Women’s participation in the First Intifada allowed for increased gender equality in Palestine. However, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, established by the Oslo Accords, created space for non-state actors (dominated by the Islamist political organization Hamas) to emerge and gain popularity. Likewise, during the post-Oslo period conservative positions on gender resurged. This paper re-examines the structural factors that facilitated increased gender inequality and argues that the nature of the occupation itself serves as the greatest force for gender inequality in Palestine. To develop and test our theory, we draw on original, large-n survey data and in-depth interviews.
This article investigates the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in European Union (EU) foreign policy, focusing on how they contribute to the emergence and codification of new frames that underpin EU external policies. It argues that changes in EU foreign policy are the result of interactions among a frame entrepreneur, often played by an NSA, and policy-makers in situations of cognitive uncertainty and when a policy window opens. The empirical evidence is based on the case of EU–Israel relations: a non-governmental orgaization (NGO) called MATTIN Group acted as frame entrepreneur and contributed to the emergence and codification of a new frame of understanding of EU–Israel relations, redefining them on the basis of a legal paradigm. This clarifies the territorial scope of bilateral agreements and ensures that the bilateral relations are constructed and implemented in accordance with EU legal framework and its commitments under international law.
Voltolini, Benedetta. Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016.
This book examines lobbying in EU foreign policy-making and the activities of non-state actors (NSAs), focusing on EU foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It sheds light on the interactions between the EU and NSAs as well as the ways in which NSAs attempt to shape EU foreign policies. By analysing issues that have not yet received systematic attention in the literature, this book offers new insights into lobbying in EU foreign policy, EU relations surrounding the conflict and the EU’s broader role in the peace process.
The book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political science, international relations, EU politics, EU foreign policy-making, Middle East studies and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Table of Contents
Introduction: ‘Embedded’ lobbying in EU foreign policy
1 Exploring lobbying in EU foreign policy-making
2 The EU and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: An overview of declarations, policies and actors
3: Who’s who? Mapping non-state actors in EU policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
4: Trade relations between the EU and Israel: Lobbying on the territorial scope of the EU–Israel Association Agreement
5 The Goldstone Report: To endorse or not to endorse it?
6 Framing the EU–Israel Agreement on pharmaceutical products: Cheaper medicines, territorial scope or policy coherence?
7 Using the national level to lobby the EU
Benedetta Voltolini is Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Political Science, Maastricht University, the Netherlands.
Rebellious non-state actors of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula have been arming themselves through smuggling networks operating in north-east Africa and the Middle East. They feature complex, dynamic, open systems which include many components of various organisational and national identities, and which are driven by various motives, united in order to accomplish the goal of arms smuggling. Previously, this system was dominated by the supply of Iranian large and high-quality weapon systems, mainly rockets, to the Palestinian Hamas, enabling them to build up military force that has sustained long-standing conflict against the stronger Israel. The Arab turmoil initiated dramatic changes in the arming system: Iran stopped, at least temporarily, the channelling of weapons to the Hamas due to its support of the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. Egypt blocked many of Hamas’s smuggling tunnels, intensifying Hamas’s strategic isolation. Following the removal of Gaddafi and lack of government, Libya became a major arms source, serving mainly regional radical Islamic groups. Salafist jihadist groups in Sinai revolted against the Egyptian government, using huge local stockpiles of weapons and operational cooperation with Palestinian Islamists. This article argues that to survive, rebellious non-state actors must exploit arming opportunities in the physical, social and political environment, whereas securing shared borders is vital for defeating rebellious non-state actors. The arming of non-state actors should be analysed broadly, considering the needs of the civilian population among whom the militants are operating.
Like many nonstate military actors, Hamas has long provided social services to its constituents, but the mechanism by which charity leads to increased public support is poorly understood. This article argues that providing charity benefits nonstate actors not because it isolates recipients or acts as a bribe but because it allows organizations like Hamas to overcome the legacies of their own military activities and extremist ideologies. Service provision allows them to demonstrate that they are not merely soldiers or ideologues, but capable bureaucrats and managers as well.
Berti, Benedetta. “Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance.” Middle East Journal 69.1 (2015): 9-31.
The article tracks Hamas’s political evolution by analyzing its governance record, as well as its political, economic, and social policies as the effective government in the Gaza Strip between 2007 and 2013. By providing a specific snapshot in time, the study focuses on understanding Hamas’s approach to governance, as well as how the group has been able to function as a “rebel government” since taking over the Gaza Strip. The article also highlights the complex interactions between Hamas the political party, Hamas the effective government, and Hamas the non-state armed group.