In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, relations between Britain and the Arab world improved, particularly with Egypt, and also with Jordan. This article shows the driver of this decisive shift in policy was the initiative of Foreign Secretary George Brown. Well aware of the aversion some of his colleagues felt toward Egyptian president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and anger over King Husayn of Jordan’s defense pact with the Egyptian leader, Brown opted to maneuver behind the government’s back and did not hesitate to manipulate and even deceive both the government and Prime Minister Harold Wilson.
Honig, Or, and Ariel Reichard. “Realism or Radicalism: Explaining Autocratic Rulers’ Strategic Choices Following Military Defeats in the Middle East.” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 6.2 (2015): 125-46.
This article explains autocratic rulers’ behavior in the aftermath of costly military defeats in the Middle East. Essentially, military defeats cause political crises of legitimacy for all Middle East rulers, albeit to varying degrees of severity. In responding to these crises, rulers have two broad strategic options: addressing the crisis’ root cause by reversing the strategic consequences of defeat or merely mitigating the immediate political symptoms of the crisis. Crucially, it is the severity of the political crisis that is the primary factor determining the choice of strategy. However, when the crisis is less severe, additional factors—leaders’ own beliefs, perceptions about the viability of each option, and their regime’s particular vulnerabilities—also determine the choice between the two orientations.