New Article: Tziarras, Israel-Cyprus-Greece: a ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance

Tziarras, Zenonas. “Israel-Cyprus-Greece: a ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance.” Mediterranean Politics (early view; online first).

ְְ 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1131450

 

Abstract

By adopting a neorealist approach to alliance formation this paper examines the trilateral partnership of Israel, Cyprus and Greece. It argues that since its inception in 2011 it has developed into a (‘comfortable’) quasi-alliance – a less formal and more flexible form of alliance than the traditional ones – driven by profit and threat-related individual and collective motivations. The primary motivations behind the formation of the quasi-alliance have been the common perceptions of Turkey as a security threat and energy-related interests. Moreover, it is suggested that the ‘comfortable’ and quasi nature of the alliance could allow the three states to manoeuvre politically so as not to exclude future and parallel relations with Turkey. This means that the transformation of the quasi-alliance into a more formal alliance is a rather unlikely scenario and that it could fade out should Turkish‒Israeli relations improve.

 

 

 

New Article: Agdemir, Growing Relations between Israel and Greece

Agdemir, A. Murat. “A New Partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Growing Relations between Israel and Greece.” Mediterranean Quarterly 26.4 (2015): 49-68.

 
URL: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v026/26.4.agdemir.html
 
Abstract

There have been important changes in the politics of the eastern Mediterranean since the discovery of energy resources and the disintegration of Turkish-Israeli relations. Israel upgraded its relationship with Greece and Cyprus after its ties with Turkey deteriorated. Since shortly after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, the widening divergence in interests between Turkey and Israel have provided the geopolitical impetus for the development of a rapprochement between Greece and Israel. While political, military, and economic cooperation, in particular, between Israel and Greece have significantly developed, the relations have also blossomed over mutual concern about the energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean. This essay examines the burgeoning relationship between Israel and Greece since 2010 and considers whether this relationship constitutes an important strategic alliance in the eastern Mediterranean.

 

 

 

New Book: Tziampiris, The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation

Tziampiris, Aristotle. The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation. New York: Springer, 2015.

 

9783319126036

 

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Balance of Power and Soft Balancing 21

3 The Fraught Relationship Between Greeks and Jews 39

4 Greece, Israel, and the Rise of Turkey 55

5 The Beginning of the Israeli–Greek Rapprochement 77

6 The Intensification of Israeli–Greek Cooperation 103

7 The Beginning of Energy Cooperation Between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece 135

8 Conclusion 163

References 181

 

New Book: Alpher, Periphery – Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies

Alpher, Yossi. Periphery. Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

 

1442231017

 

Since its establishment after World War II, the State of Israel has sought alliances with non-Arab and non-Muslim countries and minorities in the Middle East, as well as Arab states geographically distant from the Arab-Israel conflict. The text presents and explains this regional orientation and its continuing implications for war and peace. It examines Israel’s strategy of outflanking, both geographically and politically, the hostile Sunni Arab Middle East core that surrounded it in the early decades of its sovereign history, a strategy that became a pillar of the Israeli foreign and defense policy. This “periphery doctrine” was a grand strategy, meant to attain the major political-security goal of countering Arab hostility through relations with alternative regional powers and potential allies. It was quietly abandoned when the Sadat initiative and the emerging coexistence between Israel and Jordan reflected a readiness on the part of the Sunni Arab core to deal with Israel politically rather than militarily. For a brief interval following the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, Israel seemed to be accepted by all its neighbors, prompting then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to muse that it could even consider joining the Arab League. Yet this periphery strategy had been internalized to some extent in Israel’s strategic thinking and it began to reappear after 2010, following a new era of Arab revolution. The rise of political Islam in Egypt, Turkey, Gaza, southern Lebanon and possibly Syria, coupled with the Islamic regime in Iran, has generated concern in Israel that it is again being surrounded by a ring of hostile states—in this case, Islamists rather than Arab nationalists.

The book analyzes Israel’s strategic thinking about the Middle East region, evaluating its success or failure in maintaining both Israel’s security and the viability of Israeli-American strategic cooperation. It looks at the importance of the periphery strategy for Israeli, moderate Arab, and American, and European efforts to advance the Arab-Israel peace process, and its potential role as the Arab Spring brings about greater Islamization of the Arab Middle East. Already, Israeli strategic planners are talking of “spheres of containment” and “crescents” wherein countries like Cyprus, Greece, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia constitute a kind of new periphery.

By looking at Israel’s search for Middle East allies then and now, the book explores a key component of Israel’s strategic behavior. Written in an accessible manner for all students, it provides a better understanding of Israel’s role in the Middle East region and its Middle East identity.

Table of Contents

For Whom it May Concern
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction

  1. The Periphery Doctrine at Work
  1. Evolution of a Grand Strategy
  2. The Northern Triangle: Iran and Turkey
  3. Morocco
  4. The Southern Periphery
  5. The Levant Minorities
  6. The Kurds of Northern Iraq
  7. The Jewish Dimension
  8. The American Dimension
  9. End of the First Periphery, 1973-1983

  1. Ramifications
  1. Iran: periphery nostalgia and its costs
  2. Israeli skeptics
  3. Between peripheries: peace, isolation and Islam
  4. Is there a new periphery?
  5. Arab reaction

  1. Conclusion
  1. Can Israel find a regional identity?

Heads of Mossad
Persons interviewed
Maps:

  1. The original periphery concept
  2. The expanded southern periphery
  3. The ethnic periphery
  4. A new periphery?

Index
About the Author

Yossi Alpher was an officer in Israeli military intelligence, followed by twelve years of service in the Mossad. Until 1995, he was director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. In July 2000, he served as Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Israel during the Camp David talks. From 2001 to 2012 he was coeditor of the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications.

New Article: Guzansky, Israel’s Periphery Doctrine 2.0

Guzansky, Yoel. “Israel’s Periphery Doctrine 2.0: The Mediterranean Plus.” Mediterranean Politics 19.1 (2014): 99-116.

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.870365

DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2013.870365

Abstract

This article discusses the bilateral ties that have been forming between Israel and its periphery – that is, Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan and South Sudan – and draws a comparison to Israel’s previous relations with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia. It considers the contribution of those partnerships at the security-intelligence and economic level and suggests its potential impact in the political arena. This research concludes that, despite the dividends that can be gained from security, economic and energy cooperation, its value compared to that of its predecessor is lower based on their instability, domestic issues and lower levels of regional or international influence.