New Article: Cuhadar and Kampf, Does Conflict Content Affect Learning from Simulations?

Cuhadar, C. Esra, and Ronit Kampf. “Does Conflict Content Affect Learning from Simulations? A Cross-National Inquiry into the Israeli-Palestinian and Guatemalan Conflict Scenarios.” Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 8.4 (2015): 243-60.

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ncmr.12062

Abstract

It is important to find out whether the content of a simulation has any effect on learning, whether students learn better when the simulation is about a conflict they directly experience as opposed to a conflict they have hardly heard about, and whether learning about a specific conflict changes from one identity group to another. In this article, we address these questions in a five-group experimental study, with direct parties to the conflict (Israeli-Jewish, Palestinian, and Guatemalan), third/secondary parties to the conflict (Turkish, American, and Brazilian), and distant parties to the conflict. Our results indicate that learning varies not only from one group to the other, but also with the salience of the conflict. While the simulations increase the level of knowledge about that particular conflict in almost all situations, when attitude change is concerned, the effects diversify from one group to the other.

 

 

New Article: Nissen and Waage, Norwegian Interventions in Guatemala and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Nissen, Ada and Hilde Henriksen Waage. “Weak Third Parties and Ripening: Revisiting Norwegian Interventions in Guatemala and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” International Negotiation 20.3 (2015): 389-413.

 

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341314

 

Abstract

Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles in the Oslo channel between Israel and the Palestinians, and between the URNG guerrilla and the government in Guatemala. These cases demonstrate how careful interventions by weak third parties can help disputants see negotiations as a way out both in preliminary and later phases of negotiations. However, we also argue that weak third parties should not get involved in ripening unless they can call on a mediator with more leverage once substantial negotiations begin.