Review article: Donno, Recenti studi sull’ebraismo, Israele e Medio Oriente

Donno, Antonio. “Recenti studi sull’ebraismo, Israele e Medio Oriente.” Eunomia 4.2 (2015): 627-32.
 
URL: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/eunomia/article/view/15754 [PDF]
 
Abstract

This article reviews recent publications such as Artur Patek’s Jews
on Route to Palestine
, Hillel Cohen’s 1929, Eric Gartman’s Return to Zion, Ofer Shiff’s The Downfall of Abba Hillel Silver, Jesse Ferris’ Nasser’s Gamble, Daniel Zoughbie’s Indecision Points, and more.

 

 

 

New Book: Ross, Doomed to Succeed

Ross, Dennis. Doomed to Succeed. The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015.

 

9780374141462

 

When it comes to Israel, U.S. policy has always emphasized the unbreakable bond between the two countries and our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security. Today our ties to Israel are close–so close that when there are differences, they tend to make the news. But it was not always this way.
Dennis Ross has been a direct participant in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and Israel specifically, for nearly thirty years. He served in senior roles, including as Bill Clinton’s envoy for Arab-Israeli peace, and was an active player in the debates over how Israel fit into the region and what should guide our policies. In Doomed to Succeed, he takes us through every administration from Truman to Obama, throwing into dramatic relief each president’s attitudes toward Israel and the region, the often tumultuous debates between key advisers, and the events that drove the policies and at times led to a shift in approach.
Ross points out how rarely lessons were learned and how distancing the United States from Israel in the Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations never yielded any benefits and why that lesson has never been learned. Doomed to Succeed offers compelling advice for how to understand the priorities of Arab leaders and how future administrations might best shape U.S. policy in that light.

 

Table of Contents

Preface
1. The Evolution of US Policy toward Israel
2. The Eisenhower Administration and the Pursuit of Arab Allies
3. The Kennedy Administration: Breaking Taboos and Pursuing a New Balance
4. Lyndon Baines Johnson: Emotional Ties but Constrained by Vietnam
5. Nixon and Ford: Dysfunction, War, and Interim Agreements
6. The Carter Presidency: The Pursuit of Peace and Constant Tension with Israel
7. The Reagan Administration and the Policy of Duality
8. George H. W. Bush and Israel: Discord and Responsiveness
9. The Clinton Administration and Israel: Strategic Partners for Peace
10. Bush 43: Terror, Partnership, and Bureaucratic Divisions
11. Obama and Israel: Support for Security, Little Chemistry, and Constant Challenges
12. Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future
Notes
Acknowledgements
Index
 

 

Dennis Ross is the Counselor and Davidson Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown. He was the director of policy planning in the State Department for George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton’s Middle East Peace envoy, and a special assistant to the president under Barack Obama.

 

 

Reviews: Zoughbie, Indecision Points. George W. Bush and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Zoughbie, Daniel E. Indecision Points. George W. Bush and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014.

9780262027335_0

Reviews

  • Cohen, Zach C. “The Un-Decider.” National Journal, December 13, 2014.
  • Sasley, Brent E. “Review.” Middle East Journal 69.3 (2015):471-2.
  • Jensehaugen, Jørgen. “Book Notes.” Journal of Peace Research.

 

See also author profile: Levy, Thomas. “Berkeley Postdoc and Wunderkind Probes Bush’s ‘Indecision Points’.” Berkeley News, April 7, 2015.

ToC: Israel Affairs 18,4 (2012)

Israel Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, 01 Oct 2012 is now available on Taylor & Francis Online.

This new issue contains the following articles:

Original Articles

Existential threats to Israel: learning from the ancient past
Steven R. David
Pages: 503-525
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717386

Leadership, preventive war and territorial expansion: David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol
Shlomo Aronson
Pages: 526-545
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717387

‘Two & three air raids daily. What a bother’: an American diplomat in Israel during the War of Independence
Henry D. Fetter
Pages: 546-562
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717388

The failed Palestinian–Israeli peace process 1993–2011: an Israeli perspective
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Pages: 563-576
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717389

The birth of the core issues: the West Bank and East Jerusalem under Israeli administration 1967–76 (part 1)
Moshe Elad
Pages: 577-595
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717390

The social representation of incapacity: a psycho-cultural analysis of Israel’s political arena
Mira Moshe
Pages: 596-614
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717391

The advent of Israel’s commercial lobby
Hila Tal
Pages: 615-628
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717392

The games must go on? The influence of terror attacks on hosting sporting events in Israel
Yair Galily, Ilan Tamir & Moshe Levy
Pages: 629-644
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717393

Combat stress reactions during the 1948 war: a conspiracy of silence?
Eldad Rom & Dan Bar-On
Pages: 645-651
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717394

The US, Hezbollah and the idea of sub-state terrorism
Hussain Sirriyeh
Pages: 652-662
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.717395

Book Reviews

India’s Israel policy
David Rodman
Pages: 663-665
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718493

The West and the Middle East
David Rodman
Pages: 665-666
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718494

Nation and history: Israeli historiography between Zionism and post-Zionism
David Rodman
Pages: 666-667
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718495

Israeli statecraft: national security challenges and responses
David Rodman
Pages: 667-668
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718496

Confidential: the life of secret agent turned Hollywood tycoon Arnon Milchan
David Rodman
Pages: 669-669
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718497

The anatomy of Israel’s survival
David Rodman
Pages: 669-670
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718498

Perspectives of psychological operations (PSYOP) in contemporary conflicts: essays in winning hearts and minds
David Rodman
Pages: 670-671
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718499

Holy wars: 3000 years of battles in the holy land
David Rodman
Pages: 671-671
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718500

Crossroads: the future of the U.S.–Israel strategic partnership
David Rodman
Pages: 671-673
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718501

Israel’s national security law: political dynamics and historical development
David Rodman
Pages: 673-674
DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2012.718502

Cite: Haas, Missed Ideological Opportunities and George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern Policies

Haas, Mark L. “Missed Ideological Opportunities and George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern Policies.” Security Studies 21.3 (2012): 416-54.

 

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2012.706499

 

Abstract

Numerous analysts have criticized George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern policies for their strong ideological content. This article agrees with a core premise of these critiques, but it does so for very different reasons from most analyses. Ideological rigidity on some issues, paradoxically, prevented the Bush administration from taking advantage of the full range of ways in which ideologies shape international relations. There were three major opportunities to advance US interests in the Middle East during Bush’s presidency that were created by the effects of ideologies. First, liberalizing parties in otherwise illiberal regimes tended to be significantly more supportive of US interests than other ideological groups in the same country at the same time. Second, major ideological differences among different types of illiberal enemies of the United States enhanced America’s ability to adopt “wedge” strategies toward various hostile coalitions. Finally, the existence of different types of ideological enemies in the Middle East created incentives for some illiberals to align with the United States because of mutual ideological enmity for a third ideological group. The Bush administration, however, failed at key times to take advantage of these openings. If Bush administration officials had been less ideologically dogmatic while, somewhat paradoxically, making better strategic use of ideologies’ major international effects, America’s security would have been significantly advanced in critical cases.