Nehushtan, Yossi. “Selective Conscientious Objection: Philosophical and Conceptual Doubts in Light of Israeli Case Law.” In When Soldiers Say No. Selective Conscientious Objection in the Modern Military, edited by Andrea Ellner, Paul Robinson, and David Whetham, 137-54. Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014.
The time has come for state organs to be persuaded by current philosophical thinking and to abandon old and misguided conceptions and calcifications regarding the issue of (selective) conscientious objection. Within the Israeli context there is still much work to be done by Israeli Supreme Court. The Court must rethink and re-evaluate its approach towards the distinction between selective and non-selective conscientious objections; the distinction between female and male objectors to enlisting into the army; and the distinction between secular-humanist and religious conscientious objectors. In this chapter I offered initial and partial suggestions with regard to the conceptual, moral and practical distinction between selective and non-selective conscientious objections. It would be safe to assume that Israeli Supreme Court will have the opportunity to engage with this issue yet again and presumably quite shortly. Hopefully, the court will take this opportunity to deviate from its recent erroneous decisions and to deliver a decision that may lead the way to a longed for legal change in this issue.