New Article: Bar-Joseph and Yossef, Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War

Bar-Joseph, Uri and Amr Yossef. “The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 37.4 (2014): 584-608.

URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2014.920255

Abstract

This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage.

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